Abstract -By considering the security flaws in cryptographic hash functions, any commitment scheme designed straight through hash function usage in general terms is insecure. In this paper, we develop a general fuzzy commitment scheme called an ordinary fuzzy commitment scheme (OFCS), in which many fuzzy commitment schemes with variety complexity assumptions is constructed. The scheme is provably statistical hiding (the advisory gets almost no statistically advantages about the secret message). The efficiency of our scheme offers different security assurance, and the trusted third party is not involved in the exchange of commitment.
I. INTRODUCTION
In cryptography, commitment schemes are commonly two-phased; (commit and open) cryptographic protocol, ensures secure communication between two parties, with complete disillusionment of information for mistrusted parties. The sender, A, and the receiver, B. At the end of the commit phase, the sender, A, is committed to a specific value, in which the scheme satisfies the following constraints: (1) The receiver, B, learns nothing about a committed value before the open phase (this is known as the hiding property), ( 2) The sender, A, is bound to at most one value (this is known as the binding property). In the open phase, the sender, A, sends extra information to the receiver, B, which allows him to determine the committed value. Commitment schemes are conventionally opened using identical information. However, there are several security applications noisy inputs could not be avoided such as biometric systems. Therefore, it is important to protect the biometrics information whenever replaced password/key in authentication systems. A solution to facilitate the use of approximate information in cryptographic systems is achieved by combining techniques from the areas of cryptography and error correcting codes.
In 1997, Cré peau [1] introduced a bit-commitment scheme based on error correcting codes. The scheme is apply a binary symmetric channel (BSC) to a binary codeword from the set of error correcting codes. In [2, 3] , a cryptographic primitive is proposed to enhance the biometric template protection. The scheme is a synthesis of techniques from the areas of error correcting codes and cryptography. The drawbacks of the scheme are leads to leakage of information about the user"s biometric data [4] and the error tolerance of the scheme is small (the authors assumption that only up to 10% bit of the iris code can be corrected). In fact up to 30% bits of the iris code could be difference between different presentations of the same iris [5] .
In [6] , Juels and Wattenberg proposed theoretical basis for biometrics protection schemes that they referred to as "fuzzy commitment scheme" (FCS). The Juels and Wattenberg"s scheme can be seen as a generalized and improved of [2] . In the last decade, the FCS became a popular technique for designing biometrics secrecy systems [7] . However, the fuzzy commitment scheme (FCS) is solely based on cryptographic hash function SHA1. By considering the security flaws in cryptographic hash functions such as MD5 and SHA1 families, and any commitment scheme designed through hash function has been proved to be false solution [16] . Furthermore, Commitment schemes based on noisy channels has been discussed briefly in [35, 36] In [8] , Juels and Sudan derived a fuzzy vault scheme from the fuzzy commitment scheme which is based on the hardness of polynomial reconstruction. Several concepts of cryptographic primitives based on error correcting codes have been introduced, referred to as "fuzzy extractors" and "fuzzy sketches" [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] .
Motivated by above examples that shows the importance of securing biometrics systems, and the question how to improve Juels and Wattenberg"s scheme in a secure way, this paper proposes general fuzzy commitment scheme called an ordinary fuzzy commitment scheme (OFCS), in which the security of the Juels and Wattenberg"s scheme is resolved and many fuzzy commitment schemes with variety complexity assumptions constructed. Our scheme is provably secure against all power computation adversary receiver and computation bounded adversary sender. The efficiency of our scheme offers different security assurance, then the systems usage become non-trivial. Mathematical analysis and proves are provided in detail to show that our scheme is secure and efficient. Moreover, we exploit our OFCS scheme to enhance the security of biometric authentication systems. If the biometrics template is compromised, then there is no way to use it directly again even in secure biometrics systems. This paper combines biometrics and OFCS to achieve biometric protection scheme using smart cards with renewability of protected biometric templates property.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we give background theory in error correcting codes and biometrics. Section 3 reviews Juels and Wattenberg fuzzy commitment scheme and describe its security flaw. The proposed ordinary fuzzy commitment scheme and corresponding security analysis is presented in Section 4 and 5, respectively. In Section 6, we present several constructions of ordinary fuzzy commitment scheme. In section 7 we discuss an application to biometric identification systems. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 8.
II. BACKGROUND THEORY

A. Error correcting codes
Error correcting codes are used for detecting and correcting errors when data transmitted from one place to another over a noisy channel. They naturally find applications where fuzziness" may creep in [2, 3, 6, 8] , especially because like noise fuzziness is a noise like effect which needs to be carefully accounted for. Following definitions and terminology would be fundamental to our discussions. D be their associated discrete probability distributions. Then, we defined and denoted the statistical distance between D 1 and D 2 as follows:
B. Biometrics A biometric system is defined as the automated measurements of physiological or behavioral characteristics (e.g. fingerprints, facial geometry, iris patterns, retinal patterns, hand geometry, voice prints, or, DNA) to determine, verify, or identify of a human being [17, 18] . A Biometric authentication system performs automated authentication of users depending on their physical and behavioral characteristics. Such an authentication system consists of several basic modules:
Biometric Sensor Module: The biometric sensor requires users to present their biometrics in the form of an image and therefore the analog to digital conversion. The output of the biometric sensor is the raw biometric data. The sensor is used at the enrollment of a user and every time a user needs to be authenticated.
Feature Extraction Module: The raw data are processed and analyzed. The result of the feature extraction (template) should be the most distinctive features for every user. Feature extraction is performed during the enrollment process as well as during an authentication.
Matching Module: The biometric matching module is requires that the user present their biometric for reading, template generating process is also applied here, and compared with the stored template. Then match score is generated. Matching is performed whenever a user needs to be authenticated.
Decision Module: The process of determining or authenticate the identity of the user.
The two basic processes of a biometric authentication system are the "enrollment" process and the "authentication" process. In the enrollment process of a biometric authentication system, all users are registered with the system, and biometric references data ref x is stored in the database of the system. On the other hand, the authentication process denotes the process of identity 
has been successful opened.
Otherwise ' x is an incorrect witness. The idea of "fuzziness of x " that each '
x is sufficient "close" to the original x , according to an appropriate distance metric, such as Hamming distance, but not necessary identical. The difference vector  used to translate '
x in the direction of x , facilitating to reconstruct the codeword ( ') fc [6] .
B. Security flaw of Juels and Wattenberg"s scheme The Juels and Wattenberg scheme is a simple commitment construction based solely on cryptographic hash function "the sender commit to a secret message c () hc ". Obviously, the amount of information about the codeword and the witness is hidden in the hash value () hc . However, such strategy is not secure enough [16] , because the cryptographic hash functions such as MD5 and SHA families are proven theoretically and practically vulnerable to collision and second preimage attacks (RFC 4270). Furthermore, several researchers have noticed serious security flaws and vulnerabilities in most widely used MD and SHA families [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] 
C n k is a code set, g is a error correction encoded function and f is an error correction decoded function. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the design of any commitment scheme, hiding and binding properties are the most important security aspects to be considered. In this Section we investigate the security of the proposed ordinary fuzzy commitment scheme with respect to all power computation receiver (hiding property) and computationally bounded sender (binding property). To simplify our analysis, It should be noted that the definitions of message space is   Proof: Let X and Y are two independent random variables over the same sample space ψ . So we have,
Now, let Zw  , such that w u v  , and thus v w u . Since the variables Xu  and Y w u  are independent random variables, therefore X and Z. Similarly, Y and Z are independent.
Theorem 1: Suppose that X (witness space) and C (error correcting code set) are two independent random variables over the same sample space n {0,1} , and let
obtained by "exclusive OR" of elements of X and C . Then, the probability that an adversary receiver B* is able to compute either c or x from the difference vector is no more than -2 k , where k is the size of the error correcting code C .
Proof: Assume that X and C be two independent random variables over the same sample space n {0,1} ,
be an event obtained by "exclusive OR" elements of X and C . Thus Z, X, and C are pair-wise independent random variables (Lemma1). Hence we have 1 
SCHEMES
This section introduces several constructions of an ordinary fuzzy commitment schemes. We distinguish between number-theoretic constructions [29, [32] [33] [34] applying the hardness of factoring for instance, existence of collision-free hash functions -based constructions and complexity-based construction using general cryptographic assumptions like the existence of Pseudorandom generator.
A. Factoring -Based Construction
The factoring-based ordinary fuzzy commitment scheme is based on Halevi"s conventional commitment [29] . To set up the factoring-based OFCS scheme the trusted third party Ted runs a The collision-free hash function-based ordinary fuzzy commitment scheme is based on Halevi and Micali"s conventional commitment [16] . To set up the collisionfree hash function -based OFCS scheme the trusted third party Ted runs a (1 ) , and then the collision-free hash function will given to both the sender and the receiver.
